The public education system depended on public indifference, apathy and exhaustion in order to maintain its privileged position of operation with, effectively, no oversight. The illusion of oversight was maintained by vigorously defending the chimera of local control but to those who paid much attention local control was always a fraud.

NCLB changed that comfy arrangement by thrusting public education policy under the public’s nose on an on-going basis. It’s that “on-going basis” that differentiates NCLB’s political impact from previous episodes of public education reform such as those kicked off by Sputnik and “A Nation at Risk”.

The brilliance – unintended I’m sure – of NCLB is that by harnessing the reflexive avarice of the public education system NCLB created a constituency that was dedicated to maintaining the shortcomings of the public education system in the public’s attention. Every time a teacher, administrator or school board member complained about the onerous demands of NCLB the issue of the efficacy of public education was raised.

Who played the role of continuously raising the issue of public education efficacy in the wake of “A Nation at Risk”? No one, or very few people and the public’s attention drifted much to the relief of all those dependent on public education for their livelihood.

NCLB put those same people in service of education reform by making it impossible for them to ignore the issue although their long-term interests were best served by doing just that. The public apathy, indifference and acceptance that had so ably stifled previous efforts to reform public education was undermined by the people who most benefited from that public apathy, indifference and acceptance.

I really need your assistance in sorting this out, as we will jump into the deep end of the Common Core pool in California in 2014-2015. When I read (and re-read) the Standards I focus more on the content vs. the competencies the standards espouse throughout all grades. I am concerned how teachers, administrators/school districts, Ed schools textbook writers, and test makers will interpret the standards, and how that could impact our most vulnerable children.

USE OF THIS METHOD DOES NOT JUSTIFY BREACH OF PENSION CONTRACTS.

Three years ago, a majority of Colorado legislators decided to attempt to break state contracts to cut the debt of Colorado state and local governments. In 2010, Colorado legislators passed a bill, SB10-001, that attempts to discard the obligation of Colorado governments and the state’s pension system, Colorado PERA, to pay cost-of-living (COLA) increases due retirees under their state pension contracts. Retirees in the Colorado PERA pension system, unwilling to allow the State of Colorado to take one-third of their contracted PERA pension benefits, immediately filed a lawsuit (Justus v. State.) Last year, the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed with the retirees that Colorado state and local governments have a contractual obligation to pay the annual cost-of-living adjustments due under the retiree’s contracts. The Court of Appeals also decided that (since the matter has not yet been heard by a jury) the retiree’s lawsuit should be sent back to the trial court (Denver District Court.) The trial court was ordered to determine if the Colorado General Assembly’s breach of Colorado PERA contracts in 2010 was “reasonable,” or “necessary.” Immediately after the Court of Appeal’s ruling last year, both the PERA retirees and the State of Colorado appealed the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Colorado Supreme Court. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants in the case are currently waiting to see if the Colorado Supreme Court will take the case, or send it back to the Denver District Court to make a determination as to “reasonableness” and “necessity.”

http://saveperacola.com/

In 2010, a majority of Colorado legislators decided to attempt to break Colorado PERA pension contracts to free up money for “discretionary” state and local public programs. Although the constituents of these state legislators want public services (good roads, education, police and fire protection) they do not want to pay for these services. Incredibly, many of the constituents of Colorado legislators do not want to pay for public services that they have already consumed. Therefore, they encouraged Colorado legislators to break Colorado PERA pension contracts.

For some reason, in 2010, a majority of Colorado state legislators arrived at the conclusion that Colorado’s public pension contracts are inferior to the state’s corporate contracts. If there is a threat to the financial well-being of the State of Colorado (i.e., the state with an extra billion dollars to spend next year) all Colorado contracts should be on the table, not just one set of contracts.

Like salary, Colorado PERA pension COLA benefits are compensation for work performed; specifically “deferred compensation,” presently earned. When a Colorado PERA member has completed the job, and finished earning her salary, her employer cannot retroactively take that salary from her. Her right to receive her earned salary is plainly a contractual obligation of her employer. The pension benefits that this PERA member earns each day are, similarly, a contractual obligation of her employer.

For each day that a Colorado PERA member works she is entitled to know precisely what she is earning that day. She deserves to know both the salary and the pension benefit that she earned in exchange for her day of labor. When her day of work is complete, her employer cannot retroactively change the agreement. Her compensation for the day of work is defined, just as her deferred pension compensation is defined in Colorado law. As we have seen, deferred compensation due Colorado PERA members must stand “immutable for work already performed.”

A public pension COLA is simply a method by which a defined pension benefit is provided. There is nothing inherent in this “method” (provision of a pension COLA) that negates its essence as a contractual obligation of Colorado PERA-affiliated employers.

The Colorado Legislature has placed into Colorado law an agreement to provide an “automatic,” fixed, pension COLA “escalator” to PERA members upon retirement. When the Colorado Legislature created the Colorado PERA contract in statute, the Legislature could just as well have offered PERA members a higher total pension benefit and no COLA escalator. Instead, Colorado legislators chose to deliver accrued Colorado PERA pension benefits by means of a pension COLA “escalator.”

If I buy an annuity from a private insurance company, and I opt to have my purchased income stream delivered via a cost-of-living escalator, does the insurance company that sold the annuity to me have the right to eliminate that purchased COLA benefit after the fact? Does the insurance company have the right to retroactively diminish the total value of my purchased, contracted income stream simply because I selected an escalator as a method of receiving the income stream? Perhaps the insurance company wants to use the money made available by breaking the COLA contractual provision to make desired discretionary expenditures. Perhaps the insurance company wants to construct a new headquarters building or increase the compensation of its executives. What court would permit this private sector insurance company to ignore its contractual COLA obligations? Why do we not see insurance companies in the United States attempting to escape their contractual COLA obligations? We do not see this happening because attorneys working for these insurance companies recognize such arguments as ridiculous, self-serving contrivances.
Why should the State of Colorado be permitted to retroactively take a COLA benefit that has been paid for (through paycheck deductions and labor) by Colorado PERA members for decades?

Purchased annuity COLA benefits in the private sector:

“One way to address this problem is by purchasing a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) option with the immediate annuity. The COLA option increases the dollar amount of future payments to keep up with inflation, with the goal of preserving the buying power of the immediate annuity payments.”

http://www.myretirementpaycheck.org/savings-investments/immediate-annuities.aspx

The contractual obligation of an accrued pension benefit does not disappear simply because state legislators have agreed to use a particular method of delivering the benefit. If the Colorado Legislature had, historically, placed into statute a Colorado PERA pension contract setting the initial Colorado PERA pension benefit at a maximum 20 percent of highest average salary (HAS), with a 10 percent annual COLA escalator, could the Colorado Legislature retroactively take 90 percent of the total contracted benefit by simply striking the COLA provision from Colorado law? The contractual obligation of Colorado PERA-affiliated employers to honor statutory COLA provisions does not disappear due to the fact that Colorado statutes mandate payment of a PERA member’s accrued pension benefit by means of a COLA escalator. This contrivance was embraced by the proponents of SB10-001in 2010 in the hope that Colorado PERA-affiliated employers could somehow escape their pension debt.

For fifty-two years, (since the Bills and McPhail cases) the Colorado Legislature has known that public pension COLA benefits are contractual obligations in our state. They cannot claim ignorance of this fact, they are obligated to read case law and know the implications of legislation they enact. For fifty-two consecutive legislative sessions, Colorado legislators have had opportunities to adopt any legal, prospective public pension reform they feel is appropriate. They have had many decades of opportunity to reform the Colorado PERA pension without breaking PERA contracts. While U.S. equity markets have endured extreme volatility over these decades (1987 and 2001) Colorado PERA contracts were honored. As Colorado PERA officials have noted many times, pension administrators expect market volatility. The State of Colorado cannot legitimately argue in court that the “unanticipated severity of an anticipated event” justifies the breach of Colorado PERA pension contracts.

Note that critics of public pensions focus on a single aspect of future state and local government expenditures (public pension obligations) when they argue that these governments are in “crisis.” The critics argue that public pensions are in “crisis,” because states and cities have not banked the three or four percent of future state revenues that will be needed to meet these pension obligations. The critics call this a public pension “shortfall.” State and local governments have not banked sufficient funds to cover the other 95 percent of expected future expenditures and yet, somehow, this lack of accumulated resources is not a “crisis.” As we know, public pension obligations to current workers will come due over the next 70 years, like a mortgage, they are not due tomorrow.

What entity on high has decreed that a government’s lack of current resources to immediately cover all of its accumulated pension obligations is a “crisis,” while a government’s failure to set aside resources sufficient to meet all other future expenditures is just standard operating procedure? Is the State of Colorado in “crisis” because it has bonds outstanding? Why are accumulated state financial obligations in the form of bonded debt not a “crisis,” but accumulated state financial obligations in the form of public pension debt are a “crisis”? Who decided that one of these state debt obligations has inferior legal status?

Help restore some degree of rationality to discussion of Colorado PERA public pensions. Contribute at saveperacola.com, and “Friend” Save Pera Cola on Facebook!

Facts keep getting in the way of the politically correct ideology so people like Richwine need to be tarred and feathered for their beliefs.

Standards is the real issue. If we screen immigrants based on criminal history we will be told its racist or insensitive or something. If we screen based on I.Q. same thing. If we screen based on income- same thing. Any type of standards or attempt at excellence is attacked by the mainstream politically correct culture. Meanwhile the people who form these policies live behind gated communities and protected by elite circles while the average people have to deal with rising crime, lowering I.Q.s, free falling test scores, a population that is often barely literate and harder to educate each year and so on. America’s competitiveness keeps going down and anybody who speaks up against it is tarred and feathered.

By the way read charles murray and he says many of the same things: I.Q. can be increased, better education can solve problems etc. but such approaches have their limits. The liberal policies have been in place since the 1960s has only led to spending on education doubling and tripling with flatline results. It has also led to greater gaps between races. The liberal policies that are supposed to protect the poor and minorities have harmed their performance, increase crime and so on to those people the most. It benefits no one.

As for Richwine’s dissertation? The piece fails on several levels. One of the most-important is that like so many IQ fundamentalists at any time and place, Richwine makes an artificial distinction between races and ethnic groups that doesn’t work. For example, Latinos aren’t a race, but an ethnicity, and can either be considered Caucasian or Black, depending on their heritage, It is quite likely that in the next century, Latinos will become as fully assimilated into American society (and thus, become white or black) as earlier generations of Greeks, Italians, and other groups deemed to be intellectually inferior by earlier generations of IQ fundamentalists. A large portion of Richwine’s analysis is based on rather shoddy thinking.

As for your three points: On point one: We can improve student achievement and increase levels of cognitive ability. This is because much of what determines intellectual ability is driven by the quality of learning environment. In fact, one of the reasons why early childhood education programs (along with reform of the rest of American public education) is that high-quality learning environments can help improve long-term academic outcomes, which is what one would consider a key element of cognitive ability.

As for point two: Cognitive ability is generally considered to account for less than half of life outcomes. Essentially it is a variance that provides some explanation as to why adults succeed, which is why high-quality education does matter. But it doesn’t explain all reasons.

Finally: Public policy decisions don’t necessarily have to be based on perceived levels of cognitive ability. In fact, most policy decisions are driven by other issues, including economic cost-benefit. Especially given how IQ tests are extraordinarily flawed, don’t likely measure cognitive ability, and have historically been used in ways that can best be called eugenic., one can easily argue that IQ should not be a consideration in public policy decisions.